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International Court of Justice

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Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

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I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministére Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1945.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

Filed May 22, 1946

Raeder No. 18
Defense Exhibit No....

Certificate by Attorney at Law Dr. Siemers:

I hereby certify that the following excerpt from the book:

Winston Churchill: " Great Contemporaries"

London 1935

page 261 has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg

(Dr. W. Siemers)

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Winston Churchill:"Great Contemporaries"

London 1935.

Page 261

Hitler and his Choice

"It is not possible to form a just judgement of a public figure who has attained the enormous dimensions of Adolf Hitler until his life work as a whole is before us. Although no subsequent political action can condone wrong deeds, history is replete of examples of men who have risen to power by employing stern, grim and even frightful methods but who nevertheless, when their life is revealed as a whole, have been regarded as great figures whose lives have enriched the story of mankind. So may it be with Hitler.- Such a final view is not vouchsafed to us today (written in 1935). We cannot tell whether Hitler will be the man who will once again let loose upon the world another war in which civilisation will irretrievably succumb, or whether he will go down in history as the man v restored honor and peace of mind to the great Germanic nation and brought it back serene, helpful and strong, to the forefront of the European family circle. It is enough to say that both possibilities are open at the pres moment. If, because the story is unfinished, because indee its most fateful chapters have yet to be written, we are forced to dwell upon the darker side of his work and creed we must never forget nor cease to hope for the bright alternative."

Filed May 22, 1946.

Raeder No. 20

Defense Exhibit No.

Certificate by Attorney at Law Dr. Siemers

I hereby certify that the following excerpts from the book:

Adolf Hitler: "Mein Kampf"

Munich 1939

pages 154, 501 and 749 have been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 19 March 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

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Page 154: (English translation page 140)

For such a policy there was but one ally in Europe: England.

Page 501: (English translation page 449)

There must be no majority decisions, but only responsible persons, and the word 'council' must be restored to its original meaning. Surely every man will have advisers by his side, but the decision will be made by one man.

.....

Page 450:

Even then it will not be possible to dispense with those corporations which today we designate as parliaments. But there, councillors will then actually give counsel; responsibility, however, can and may be borne only by one man, and therefore only he alone may possess the authority and right to command.

Page 749: (English translation 660)

And so the very fact of the conclusion of an alliance with Russia embodies a plan for the next war. Its outcome would be the end of Germany.

Filed May 22, 1946

Raeder No. 21

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Attorney Dr. Siemers:

I hereby certify that the following excerpt from the

Fuehrer's speech to the German Reichstag

on 26th April 1942

taken from

"D A S A R C H I V" No. 97, April 1942

pages 42 - 43 has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 14th March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

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page 42 :

Of course, there is one thing I expect : that the nation gives me the right to intervene and to act in suitable fashion at once, in all cases where the service of greater tasks is not unconditionally involved, when it is a question of to be or not to be. Front and home, transport, administration and law have to be governed bybut one idea, that is the gaining of victory. At this time, nobody may claim his well deserved rights, everyone must know that today there are only duties. I therefore ask the German Reichstag for the express confirmation that I possess the legal right to keep everyone at his duty, or simply to cashier or remove from office, anyone who, according to my certain judgement and opinion, does not fulfil his duties, irrespective of who he may be or what rights he may have deserved.

page 43 :

At this time, there are no self-glorifying persons with aquired rights, but all of us are nothing but obedient servants of the interests of our people.

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Filed May 16, 1946

Raeder No. 23

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney:

I certify herewith that the following documents:

"Joint declaration by the Fuehrer and the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, Munich, 30 September 1938 "

is correctly copied from the

White Book of the Foreign Office Nr. 2
Berlin 1939:
Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges
(Documents on the times preceding the war)

from page 147, document No. 217.

Nuernberg, 3rd April 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

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Joint declaration by the Fuehrer and the British Prime Minister Chamberlain, Munich, 30 September 1938.

We had a further conference today and are united in the knowledge that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the very highest importance to both countries and to Europe.

We regard the agreement, signed last night, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbols of the desire of both our peoples never again to wage war against each other.

We are resolved to, deal with other questions concerning our two countries by discussion and, in future, to make efforts to eliminate any possible causes of differences of opinion in order to contribute thus to the ensuring of European peace.

Adolf Hitler

Neville Chamberlain

Filed May 16, 1946

Raeder No. 27

Statement of Attorney Dr.Siemers

I hereby certify that the attached document:

"Speech by the Fuehrer on the Obersalzberg
on 22nd August 1939"

has been copied correctly from the manuscript of General Admiral Hermann B o e h m, Marutendorf near Kiel.

General Admiral Boehm was present when Hitler made his speech on the Obersalzberg on 22nd August 1939 and made the notes during the speech; he transcribed them in the present form on the same evening, that is, on 22nd August 1939 in the "Vier Jahreszeiten" hotel in Munich.

Nuernberg, 17th April 1946

(Dr.W.Siemers)

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Speech by the Fuehrer on the Obersalzberg

on 22nd August 1939

Purpose of speech to give the Fuehrer's opinion on the politica situation, to present his ideas so as to strengthen confidence i his decision. Because his decision to act was irrevocable.

As late as last spring his intention still was to postpone the solution of the Polish question, to put it on ice, so to speak in order to settle first the conflict in the West, unavoidable in his opinion. However, a politician cannot commit himself as to the sequence of events, one must be elastic. The basis for his original intentions had changed, for that matter he had never believed that the Poles would have observed the non-aggr sion pact when Germany would have been tied down somewhere els This is shown by the map, but especially by the newspapers of recent dates which disclose the innermost thoughts of the Poles.

Although this conflict with Poland was unwelcome, it was necess ry and the political situation was at present more favorable than perhaps in a few years time, for the following reasons:

1) Personal reasons on our side:

   a) His own person as asset in the life of the German people. He had unified the German people, has the confidence of and authority over the German people, such as no successor could enjoy it any greater. Any day he could be the victim of an enemy or an insane or could die a natural death. His existence therefore was of great importance for the carrying out of the tasks.

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b) A similar case can be made for Mussolini. Not the pact with Italy are decisive, but personalities. Mussolini is decisive for adherance to the pact. The court was against everything it considered adventurous, would like it best to be satisfied with what they got. Musso lini was a man"without nerves,"proof was the Abyssinia conflict.

c) The personality of Franco was also of consequence. The Fuehrer never expected more than friendly neutrali ty from Spain. She continued to be under the political influence of several parties. Only Franco was the gua- rant of uniformity and a certain continuity in politic

2) On the other side, the opponent's picture was negativ, luckily for us there are no personalities.

It is hard to make a decision which must lead to blood shed it is difficult,but comparatively easy for us because we have only one choice: get it over with or loose out. We might be able to stand the present condition economically and by exer- ting all our strength for about 10 to 15 years, not longer. Therefore we are forced to come to a decision. Such decisions are much more difficult for our adversary, his would gain nothing, his stake is much greater, enormously great.

The personalities on the opponent's side are, however, without exception below the average of what is expected from a states- man, they are no men of action.

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There are a number of tension spheres for England: In the Mediterranean the strained relation with Italy, in Asia with Japan, in the Near East England has alarmed the Mohammedans.

When the expression "Pyrrhic victory" ever applied to a nation, it was the victory of 1918 to England. On the seven seas she lost her predominance and shares it with America - her empire was shaken, Ireland became independent, the Union of South Africa aspires to the same, the appetite for it is growing in India.

Two friends of the world war 1914/1918 are gone, Russia and Italy.

With regard to commerce, England which believed to become so much richer through a war, has been disappointed. Because of the armament all countries have created their own industries, it has become difficult for England to find markets, the old order is disturbed.

France too is in a bad state, above all because of the decrease of her conscription classes.

Facts favorable for us are furthermore the occupation of Albania which, in the hands of Italy, neutralizes Jugoslavia. But this too is weaker than the Serbia of 1914, as the Croates are causing a splitting of the country, Rumania is weaker than before, and Hungary and Bulgaria are arming and marching at her border. Turkey has lost her only great man Attaturk, the men now in power are little minor are under the influence of the sterling.

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Taken everything in consideration, there are a number of favorable circumstances which might not exist any more in three years from now.

The psychological side has also to be considered. The last three great events regarding the " Ostmark" (Austria), Sudeten Land and Czecho Slowakia are doubtless an excellent political accomplishment. It would, however, been extremely dangerous for a nation and especially for her armed forces to regard the latter solely as an instrument of bluffing for political purposes without the intention of using them in earnest. From the view point of a later, large and final settlement in the West which he believed unavoidable, it appears advisable from a military point of view to test the armed forces in a single task.

The question arises now: Is there any likelihood that this task can be carried out isolated and without bringing about other catastrophes ?

It is obvious that a political situation with Poland such as it exists today is unbearable in the long run. Therefore the proposal of the Fuehrer about the cession of Danzig and the creation of a connecting line through the corridor. This attempt for a settlement was disturbed by England, which worked herself in a frenzy and incited Poland to impertinent notes and military measures. The relation between Germany and Poland must be tolerable or an unbearable tension will be created. But England desired and still desires exactly a permanent unstable condition in order

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to let Poland loose/any time she wants to attack herself. In that way, however, the initiative is no longer in our hands. From this point of view also, it would be better to act now rather than later.

Bad compromises must be refused, the demand for "nice gestures", that language of Versailles, which already can be heard again. We, in particular, must watch our prestige, as it is very important for us.

The likelihood of an intervention of the Western powers in a conflict is, in the opinion of the Führer, not great.

The carrying out of his plans would certainly be a daring enterprise. It would be a grave mistake to assume that politicians received any directives from God. Nobody expects this from a general, but one hopes for it for a politician. This, however, does just as little apply to a politician as to a general, both have to find their decisions in their own heart. The alternative for us is to act or to be destroyed in the long run.

He, the Führer, could say that he had, up to now, been right in his judgement of the situation in crises. He remind of the withdrawel from the League of Nations and the introdu tion of conscription. His advisers had warned him, fearing war, and in the latter case they had suggested only a limite number of divisions. He himself had stubbornly stuck to 36 divisions. He reminded of the occupation of the Rhineland.

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His advisers had suggested to withdraw again a few garrisons as a "gesture". Mr. Poncet had seen him eight days before the reoccupation and had informed him that a march into the Rhineland would mean war to France. He had stubbornly upheld his opinion against everybody and he had proved to be right. There was also a great risk involved in the case of the Eastmark (Austria), Sudetenland and Czecho Slowakia and he had come through the crisis. There are always situations which required great daring, such as before the battle of Cannae for Hannibal, before Leuthen for Frederick the Great and before Tannenberg for Hindenburg -Ludendorf. There was also a great risk involved in the present situation which could be mastered only through iron determination.

The Führer does not believe in an intervention of the Western powers for the following reasons:

The two countries England and France had, it is true, given a guarantee to Poland, whereby France had been only dragged along by England. In judging the situation in the two countri it must be said that England had an excellent propaganda. The attitude of many Germans had given considerable support to this English propaganda in the fall of 1938. They had said before and during the crisis:" England will intercede in favor of Czecho Slowakia, even with her armed forces" - When this did not come off, they said:" We admit we were wron the Führer was right. He won because he had the better nerves and stuck it out". This was immediately taken up in

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England and the government was strongly reproached for having lost their nerves. If it would not have done this but instead had taken the risk of war, the German chancellor would have given in. This opinion that he, the Führer would only bluff but really never risk anything had rendered the present situation more difficult for him.

How is now the present military situation in England ?

The naval ship building program has only partly been carried out, its effect is not to be expected before 1941/42 The land troops had not been noticeably increased. The possible strength on land has been estimated at 3 divisions, he might even go as far as 5 to 6 but not more.. In the air a certain success can be noted which, however is still in its beginning. The modern anti aircraft gun had been introduced last year, there are 150 to 200 guns available in the country, the monthly deliveries amount to 15-20. Even with us and our better industry an increase of this production would require 9-12 months, for instance to increase the production from 70 to 90, how much more so in England. She was also vulnerable from the air. The airforce itself had in England about 130 000 men, while ours had 390 000 men.

Political and military complications in the world are therefore not welcome for England as she had to defend many positions.

What England thinks of Poland is shown by the negotations for a loan. England had declined Poland's request for 8 million pounds gold sterling, although she had recently invested half a billion in China. When Poland then requested

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arms they have mentioned ridiculous figures of obsolete material, in other words declined any serious assistance with the reason that they need their gold and arms themselves. Only such credit for goods had been granted which do not mean any serious help. The situation of England was certainly precarious.

" It therefore seems impossible to me that any responsible British statesman would take the risk of a war for England in this situation."

France cannot afford a long bloody war, her conscription classes are too small, her material not sufficient. France was forced into this situation against her will, the word "war of nerves" applied to France.

Which are now the possibilities for an intervention of the western powers ?

1) The blockade, which however has not the significance any more as before.

2) The attack on land. Here one had to consider what it would mean for the French soldier who had been brought up with the idea to defend the Maginot Line, to come out of this defense line and attack the German Westwall, to loose perhaps a quarter of a million men without any definite guarantee of success. Because the German nation who had heroically defended shellholes before, would certainly hold the present Westwall.

The Western powers might perhaps try to advance against Germany through neutral territory, and here the Führer began to review the neutrals.

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All of them had the honest desire to remain neutral: the Nordic states unconditionally. Switzerland would shoot at everybody who violate her neutrality. The Netherlands were neutral by principle for fear for her east asiatic colonies which otherwise would be immediately menaced by Japan. Belgium was sincerely neutral, less for moral reasons than because of her bad experience of the world war where she became the battle field and did not get anything out of the war. It would, however, be impossible for England and France to violate the neutrality of this country against her will.

Perhaps the declarations of neutrality by these countries were given at the instigation of England in order to give England a reason for her drawing back at the outbreak of a conflict between Germany and Poland. She could then say: "We cannot break through the Westwall. A demarche with Holland and Belgium for permission to march through was declined. We cannot violate their neutrality by force, - therefore we regret that we are unable to help".

Now many say: "England is prepared for a long war, expects it or even desires it, to force Germany to her knees, just as after 1914." The Fuehrer believes this opinion to be wrong. In 1914 nobody expected a long war or even desired it. It was only after the big battles of Tannenberg and the Marne that everybody saw with alarm that now there would be no quick decision but a long war. Now England too did not want a long war because she could not know a month in advance what unexpected things she would encounter in the world. But the whole world was aware of our strength in the long run. We entered the world war very badly prepared in materials and with only enough munitions

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for a few months and still, at the end we had an enormous material improvement. The present situation was, however, entirely different, we are economically prepared for the mobilization of the entire German nation.

Among the Western powers there was hope for the cooperation of Russia which aside from the material support was also of psychological significance. The decision to shed blood is difficult. One is apt to ask: Why just I? So the hope of England was directed towards Russia. But only a blind optimist could believe that Stalin would be so crazy as not to see through England's intentions namely to wage only a kind of stationary war in the West and to let Russia carry the bloody burden of the war in the East. For these reasons the Western powers did not wish to enter into any definite commitments and every time when the concrete question about it came up, the negotiations came to a deadlock, as no positive answer as given.

Stalin furthermore has to be afraid just as much of a victorious army as of a beaten one. The dismissal of Litwinow as Foreign Minister affected the Fuehrer like a gun shot as a sign of a reorientation with regard to thethe Western powers. A careful change in the political attitude took place, beginning with the fact that the Fuehrer treated the Russian ambassador at a reception just as politely as the other diplomats. The Ambassador expressed his thanks the same evening for not having been treated in a second class manner at the reception. Further discussions in the economical sphere resulted which led to a commercial agreement. Finally

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a proposition came from the Russians:

1.) For a non aggression pact

2.) For an intervention between Russia and Japan

3.) For a solution of the questions of the Baltic provinces. The non aggression pact was to be signed on 23 August.

"I have struck this instrument - the assistance of Russia – from the hands of the Western powers. Now we have the possibility to strike at the heart of Poland, the military road, to the best of our knowledge, is free".

Abroad the news of the pact had struck like a bombshell and was the greatest political event in recent times.

The situation was best characterized by a statement of Lloyd George who in Parliament asked the Government if they had assured themselves of the help of Russia before their guarantee to Poland.

"If this is not the case, then the policy of the government is the most stupid and most criminal one imaginable."

Naturally this new course necessitated a change of his, the Fuehrer's attitude, a certain conversion, and also demands sacrifices. But he believes that the German people would understand him 100% and that he had their consent. On the other hand the effect on the Western powers would be staggering.

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Naturally the Western powers would try to save face in a conflict between Germany and Poland. They would perhaps recall their ambassadors, perhaps establish a trade blockade.

This can be met only by iron determination: We have to show that we had always reckoned with England - France and that even then Germany could win if she is only united. The attitude of every superior officer is important, the attitude of the armed forces depends on it, the attitude of the armed forces influences the attitude of the whole nation. But a nation is not being educated for efficiency by a long peace, but by getting accustomed to toughness and trouble. For that matter one should realize: On the other side also there are human beings with all their worries and troubles, in the end it is not machines which are fighting the battles, but men. And we have the best men.

It is not true that in 1918 we collapsed because of lack of material, because materially we were in a much better condition than in 1915 and 16. But the spiritual prerequisites for carrying on to the end which constitute the substance were lacking. Frederick the Great has for years withstood solely through the strength of his heart until lady luck smiled again for him. Determination and composure spell success. Anyone who has chosen a hard decision will also find this strong composure.

The goal is the elimination and crushing of the military power of Poland even though war in the West may result. Greatest speed at the success in the East offers the best prospects for a localisation of

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the conflict.

The conflict will be set in motion by an appropriate propaganda. The credibility is unimportant hereby, the right lies in the victory. We have to steel our heart and make it hard. Whoever has pondered over his world order knows that its meaning lies in the success of the best by means of force. And the German people belong to the best races of the earth. Providence has made us the leaders of this people and given hereby us the task to secure the necessary living space for the German people who are compressed, 140 persons into a square kilometre. Greatest harshness can mean greatest mildness during the accomplishment of such a task.

We can and must believe in the worth of the German soldiers. He mostly kept his nerves in crises while the leadership had lost them. Example, the battle of the Marne. The leaders therefore must be iron hard.

To sum it up: Necessary is speed of the operations, adaptation to every new situation, crushing of the enemy's strength wherever it shows itself, to the end. This is the military goal as a prerequisite of the narrower political goal of a subsequent drawing of the boundary lines.

/signed/ Boehm

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Rejected

Raeder No. 28

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement by Dr. Siemers, Attorney :

I certify herewith that the follwing document :

"The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin to the French Premier Minister for Defense and for War, Daladier"

is correctly copied from the

White Book of the Foreign Office Nr. 6, Berlin, 1941 :

"The Secret Files of the French General Staff"

pp. 24 - 25, document No. 3.

Nuernberg, 6th March 1946.

(Dr. W.Siemers.)

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The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, to the French Premier Minister for Defense and for War, Daladier.

T o p S e c r e t

Paris, 1st September 1939

I regard it as my duty to inform you in writing of my point of view, which I have already been allowed to do verbally, with regard to the question of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg (and possibly Holland).

Of course, I understand the point of view taken by the French Government and settled in the latest conferences with the governments of these three countries. Guarantee of their neutrality, guarantee that we will penetrate into their countries only on their request for help. From the moral point of view, France could take no other attitude. She can only fulfil her obligations.

It is equally necessary to be certain that the Belgium's present attitude is in effect entirely to the advantage of Germany.

While France, in the case of an offensive operation against Germany between the Rhine and the Moselle on a front of approximately 125 kilometer, would meet with a very strong system of fortifications, we would have a front more than twice as long between the Meuse and the Moselle (especially if we could march across the Dutch territory from Maastricht).

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For an attack, we would find considerably more favorable terrain there and less strong fortification installations which are only now starting to be partially constructed; we would also come across much more valuable targets. The use of Belgium would offer us much more favorable bases for the airforce against the lower Rhine provinces, the industrial centers and, if the occasion arises, against cities. Only in this way could we give Poland strong, really effective and relatively quick assistance because even through the extension of our offensive front alone we would tie down a larger number of fighting forces.
Furthermore : Spanish and particularly Italian neutrality would release us enough means for a powerful action of this type, even without our having to await English assistance.

It need not be emphasized that also from the purely defensive point of view, we are interested - in the case of a later German action against us through Belgium and Holland - in coming to the assistance of the Belgian forces in the defense of such important obstacles as the Albert canal, the Liege fortress, the Meuse and, even before the Meuse line, the easily defended terrain stretching from Liege to the Moselle in the Malmedy zone, which is difficult to take, and, if possibly, in that of the deep river beds of the Oour and Sauer. This position would leave us the complete advantage of the Belgian air base and keep the war away

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from the French frontiers and particularly from our rich Northern provinces. If the Belgians were not to call upon us until the moment they are attacked by the Germans, there is no doubt that, numerically and as regards their strength they would not have the means to defend their front successfully against an invasion and we would have to bear the brunt of an encounter with the added difficulty of supporting the retreating armies, a difficult task considering the possibility of motorization and the modern air force.

With a man like King Albert, who has already proved his worth, such outspoken language could have been employed. Are there people in Belgium who can understand it, if not immediately than at least at the decisive moment ? I cannot tell. It would, however, be regrettable if there were no men who were aware of the fate of their country nor knew full well that, in the case of a German victory, Belgium at least would be thrown into complete and slave-like dependence on the Reich.

It seemed to me necessary that the French Government should become acquainted with the High Command's point of view.*)

Gamelin

Facsimile p. 172

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*)
In a later note of 16th November General Gamelin returns to the same train of thought with the following words : "It is of particular interest to France to penetrate into Belgium. In this manner we transfer the war outside our frontiers and best protect our industrial area in the North. But this is even more important to Great Britain : then, it would be impossible for the enemy to use the air-and U-boat bases in Belgium and, in addition, if our forces occupied Belgium, England could advance her lines of air defense for the protection of her area.

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Rejected

Raeder No. 29

Defense Exhibit No.

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney-at-law:

I certify herewith that the following document:
Hand-written letter by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Levant troups, General Weygand, to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin
is correctly copied from

The White Book of the Foreign Office, No. 6, Berlin,1941:
Secret files of the
French General Staff
pp. 27-28, document No. 5.

Nuernberg, 26 March 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

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Hand-written letter by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Levant troups, Gen. Weygand, to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin

Beiruth, 9 September 1939

My dear Gamelin:

I am using the courier leaving tomorrow to give you a short report. At my arrival I found everything here in good order; the army in normal state; the country quiet.

The transfer to a state of war and my taking over command were well received by the population.

We are getting the expeditionary corps ready for battle. Of course, I am impatiently expecting the arrival of the necessary reinforcements which are partly announced partly still subject to discussions (above all, as regards the airforce). General Gaillault in all matters applies himself with intelligence, energy and precision which deserve to be mentioned.

You are familiar with the reasons for the delay of my trip to Ankara. A telegram from Massigli today gives me hope for speedy elimination of still existing difficulties. He also informs me that the Greek General Staff is not yet in a position to desire my visit but that it would dispatch an officer with whom I will have a secret conversation. All these delays and precautions, which I understand, are very embarrassing to me because they confuse the Salonika question. In case the present

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political situation with regard to Italy does not permit immediate placement of Allied troups in Salonika, one could , in my opinion, demand that Greece tolerate extensive preparations for this occupation- in particular the dispatching of specialists for the setting up of bases, the storing of supplies and perhaps through work to be carried out for the repair of roads or the defensive works, through the Greeks themselves. I will try to achieve this in the first conversation with the Greeks in Ankara.

Concerning preparations for the transportation of the expeditionary corps, I fear that the Turkish railroads will only be able to handle a very small part and that transportation by rail over the entire distance therefore will not be possible. For this reason one will have to resort to sea transportation which not only will be in less endangered but faster on the whole if embarkation takes place in Beiruth and not in Smyrna. This is the opinion of Admiral Cunningham and also that of Admiral de Carpentier. I wired you that the British Admiral, because of his plan of operation, asked not to be requested for action during the first fortnight after the outbreak of hostilities. But what becomes of this plan of operation in the present situation? In any case, the British Navy will have to get the transport fleet ready for action and be responsible for the safety of the convoys. If the solution of sea transportation from Beiruth to Salonika along the entire line

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will be given preference, of course the large units provided for reinforcement of the expeditionary corps will also have to be shipped directly from our harbours to Salonika. All this, of course, will not prevent me from trying to obtain the most favorable conditions with regard to the Turkish railroads. I will take experts along. One officer already is in Bagdad in order to organize the transit of the Madagascan labor battalions.

Finally a word about Cyprus, which is very inadequately protected by our friends (one company). It would be regrettable to lose this advanced air base and to leave it to the Italians who would then have the possibility of carrying out bombing attacks on Haifer. We already have a fuel dump there.

This morning while examining the question of supply for the population with the Chief Commissioner and Caillault, we came to the conclusion that it might be practical to set up an interallied coordination committee to get the full value of certain vital raw material sources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Could you have this question examined?

H0688 — 0034

Finally I still have to inform you - and this is really all - that I asked the Prime Minister today by telegram to make 100,000,000 francs available for the High Command in order to replenish the insufficient reserves of the common fund. We will have to use advance payments, as a matter of fact, we need them now in order to be able to fill certain gaps in the food supply for the population.

I am, my dear Gamelin, with passionate wishes for the success of our arms and most sincere regards to you your

Weygand

- I believe that regular connection by air can be established.

- Please remember that we are far away and are impatiently awaiting news from the fighting front.

Facsimile, p. 178.

H0688 - 0035

Rejected

Raeder No. 31

Defense Xhibit No.

Certificate by Attorney Dr. Siemers:

I certify herewith that the following document:

"The Commander in Chief of the French Army
General Gamelin, to the French Premier,
Minister for Defense and War. Daladier"

from the

White Paper of the Foreign Office No.6, Berlin 1941:
"The secret documents
of the French General Staff "

from page 35, Document No. 10, has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

(Dr. W. Siemers)

H0688 - 0036

The Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin to the French Premier, Minister for Defense and War, Daladier

T o p s e c r e t

No 267/3 E.M. DN

Command Station, 18 October 1939

In reply to your accompanying letter, 1379/DN, of 11 October, may sug est that our military attache in Bukarest be placed in charge of the execution all the measures for the possible destruction of the Rumanian oil storage depots. Mr. Wenger would be responsible for carrying them out.

I think it advisable, for the sake of appearances, that Mr. Wenger be given the rank of colonel.

I return herewith the documents sent.

Gamelin

Facsimile page 193

Rejected

H0688 – 0037

Raeder No. 32

Defense Exhibit No....

Certificate by Attorney Dr.Siemers:

I hereby certify that the following document:

"The French Premier and Foreign Minister Daladier to Corbin,the French Ambassador in London"

from the

White Paper of the Foreign Office No.6,Berlin 1941:

"The secret documents of the French General Staff"

from page 36, document No.11, has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 6th March 1946.

(Dr.W.Siemers)

H0688 – 0038

The French Premier and Foreign Minister Daladier to Corbin, the French Ambassador in London.

Secret

No.1832 Paris 27th October 1939

Blocking fo shipping on the Danube.

Our special authorities have agreed with the corresponding British authorities to block merchant shipping on the Danube by suitable destruction. As you know, a considerable part of the merchandise traffic with the Balkans uses this stretch either going to Germany or coming from Germany. Shortly, there will be the opportunity of using this route for Russian products. The efforts made at present by Germany to improve shipping on the Danube, so that it can be used more intensively, have given rise to the idea of cutting this traffic route.

Whilst our authorities have received the necessary permission from the French government to carry out the operations, prepared the English authorities are still waiting for the permission requested from the Foreign Office. According to statements made to our Supreme General Staff from the English side, the question has been submitted to Lord Halifax personally.

I would be grateful if you would take the next opportunity of calling the attention of the secretary of State to this urgency and significance of the decission to be made.

H0688 - 0039

Moreover, it was the British Blockade Ministry (Blockade-ministerium), which first called the attention of our authorities to the importance of this matter.

Facsimile page 194

Filed May 17, 1946

Raeder No. 33

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement of Attorney at Law Dr. Siemers :

I hereby certify that the following document :

" BARGETON, the French Ambassador in Brussels
to the French Foreign Office "

from the

White Paper of the Foreign Office No.6, Berlin 1941 :

"The Secret Files of the French General Staff"

from page 37, document No. 12 has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 6 March 1946.

(Dr.W.Siemers).

H0688 - 0040

H0688 – 0041

BARGETON, the French Ambassador in Brussels to the French Foreign Office

Telegram

No. 186

Brussels, 9 November 1939
12.45 o'clock

T o p s e c r e t

Mr. SPAAK has told me that he is personally very much occupied with one question, the solution of which seems to be a delicate matter, (and) to which he wants to call the attention of your Excellency; the subject is the command over the troops that at the proper occasion have to co-operate with the Belgian army which is led by the King. It can actually be predicted that the Belgian divisions which are all committed have no other protection and general reserves than the French and English troops.

BARGETON

Photo Copy page 196.

Filed May 17, 1946

Raeder No. 34

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement of Attorney at Law Dr. Siemers :

I hereby certify that the following document :

"The Supreme Commander of the French Army
General GAMELIN to General LELONG, Military
Attache at the French Embassy in London

from the

White Book of the Foreign Office, No.6, Berlin 1941 :

The Secret Files of the French General Staff

from page 39, document No. 14 has been copied correctly.

Nuernberg, 25 March 1946.

(Dr. W. Siemers).

- [illegible] --
180

H0688 - 0042

H0688 – 0043

The Supreme Commander of the French Army, General GAMELIN to General LELONG , Military Attache at the French Embassy in London.

Telegram

T o p s e c r e t

No. 88 Cab/D.N.

Command Port 13 November 1939, 15.00

Answer to your telegram 812(x)

Inform the British delegation that the French command completely upholds the planned action inclusive of the occupation of islands in the Schelde river. This occupation represents indispensable protection of left flank of allied forces no matter whether they advance to the Dyle or only to the Schelde. Besides, it represents the only possible connection with the Southern wing of the Dutch defence in the territory of BERG OP ZOOM - ROSENDAAL if it cannot be pushed further to the East. Besides, in case of occupation of the Schelde position it becomes absolutely necessary to hold the islands, so that the allied forces cannot be attacked from the flank by enemy elements that take foot on the mentioned island, and in order that the fortresss of Antwerp itself cannot be fired upon by ships which are anchored on the Eastern arm of the Schelde river. - Protection of the mouth of Maas and Waal has to be taken care of by Dutch forces which defend the fortresss Holland.

(x) not on hand

H0688 – 0044

Finally, if the occupation of the islands is not sufficient to make the complete utilization of the shipping route from the Scheldt to Antwerp possible, it will permit a limited amount of traffic or at least facilitate supplying the fortress of Antwerp and thereby relieve the railroads.

Besides, occupation would only be possible with Dutch consent.

GAMELIN

Photo Copy page 196 .

Filed May 17, 1946

Raeder No. 35

Statement of Attorney at Law Dr. SIEMERS

I hereby certify that the following excerpts from:

Document No. 1809-PS:

Diary of General JODL (WFA) covering the time from 1 February to 26 May 1940

from page 9 and page 40 has been copied correctly.

Nuremberg 17 April 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0688 - 0045

H0688 - 0046

page 9:

13 February

. . . . . .

Have heard from Admiral CANARIS that Group ROWEL shall be committed in mass from Bulgaria against the Caucasus. I should find out from whom this wrong idea emanates.

. . . . . .

page 40:

3 May:

. . . . . .

Fuehrer declines the wish of the Luftwaffe to install a listening post in the Caucasus.

. . . . . .